4/8 – Geopolitics & Diplomacy Analysis

For much of the twentieth century, the United States stood unchallenged in its dominance over the Western Hemisphere. Through a mix of economic muscle, strategic alliances, and military influence, Washington held an unrivaled sway across Latin America. But in the decades following the Cold War, U.S. attention drifted elsewhere—toward Middle Eastern wars, European security dilemmas, and the rise of China in the Indo-Pacific. Left behind, the Americas received little more than sporadic drug war cooperation and failed attempts to manage migration flows. Into this vacuum stepped new players: China with its billions in infrastructure investment, and Russia with its focus on military ties and disinformation. As U.S. engagement stagnated, the region became more geopolitically pluralistic—and far less deferential to American leadership.

President Donald Trump’s renewed presence in the White House with Marco Rubio as the new Secretary of State marks a stark shift from benign neglect to assertive intervention. Having long signaled his desire to reassert U.S. supremacy in its backyard, Trump’s second term has abandoned the rhetorical posture of his first in favor of concrete—and often coercive—action. His team has embraced a 21st-century version of the Monroe Doctrine, not through diplomatic consensus, but through military threat, strategic pressure, and economic muscle.

Cases in Action

The early signs of Trump’s hemispheric strategy reveal a pattern: compel compliance through high-stakes ultimatums and uncompromising demands. Panama, historically one of Washington’s most loyal allies, was an early test case. Under U.S. pressure—fueled by threats to “reclaim” the Panama Canal—the Panamanian government abruptly pulled out of China’s Belt and Road Initiative, scrapped Chinese-funded infrastructure projects, and granted priority access to the canal for U.S. Navy vessels. Even more symbolically, a Hong Kong-based company operating ports at both ends of the canal sold its holdings to a BlackRock-led American consortium. This was hailed by Trump as a strategic victory in the competition with Beijing.

Mexico has been met with an even heavier hand. Facing the threat of crushing 25% tariffs and the designation of drug cartels as foreign terrorist organizations (which could justify U.S. military operations inside Mexico), the López Obrador administration deployed 10,000 National Guard troops to its border and allowed U.S. marines to train Mexican special forces. Though the cooperation yielded temporary breathing room, Trump went ahead with the terror designations anyway and continues to dangle economic punishment as leverage.

El Salvador, eager to maintain temporary protected status for its citizens living in the U.S., agreed to absorb migrants deported from the U.S., regardless of nationality—a clear example of transactional diplomacy tilted entirely in Washington’s favor.

Short-Term Wins, Long-Term Costs

At first glance, these moves might suggest Trump is reestablishing U.S. authority across the hemisphere. But these early concessions belie deeper and more dangerous undercurrents. In focusing on coercion over cooperation, Trump’s strategy ignores a fundamental reality: Latin America today is no longer a region of passive dependencies, but of savvy actors with growing agency and global options.

Countries across the region are hedging—balancing relationships with the United States while deepening ties with emerging powers like China. This trend is less ideological than pragmatic. Nations like Brazil, Argentina, and even U.S.-aligned Canada have diversified their trade portfolios, signed new agreements with Europe and Asia, and embraced China’s capital, infrastructure, and market access. Trump’s bullying tactics may secure short-term compliance, but they risk accelerating Latin America’s strategic recalibration away from unilateral U.S. alignment.

Beijing’s rise in Latin America has been patient, methodical, and effective. Through long-term loans, infrastructure projects, and steady diplomatic engagement, China has become the top trading partner for several key economies. It has invested in railways in Argentina, dams in Ecuador, and telecommunications across the region. It has persuaded most Latin American countries to sever diplomatic ties with Taiwan and is now cautiously expanding its security footprint through police training and cooperation agreements.

Unlike the U.S., China has achieved these advances not through threats or ultimatums but by offering attractive deals and economic benefit. While Washington has tried to exclude Huawei from Latin American 5G networks, it failed to offer compelling alternatives. Despite warnings about surveillance risks, Huawei remained the most affordable and reliable provider.

Moscow’s strategy has been narrower but no less effective. Russia has cemented military relationships with countries like Cuba, Venezuela, and Nicaragua—supplying arms, conducting joint exercises, and engaging in intelligence sharing. It has also launched media and disinformation campaigns to stoke anti-U.S. sentiment. Though Russia’s economic presence is small, its influence in security and information domains creates persistent irritants for Washington.

The first Trump administration’s Latin America policy was marked by inconsistency, infighting, and a failure to adapt to the region’s changing dynamics. Efforts to undermine Venezuela’s Nicolás Maduro by recognizing an opposition figure as president floundered; a botched 2019 coup attempt led by ex-U.S. operatives only worsened perceptions. In 2020, Washington’s installation of Mauricio Claver-Carone as president of the Inter-American Development Bank—a move meant to dilute China’s sway—backfired when he was ousted over misconduct, leaving the U.S. diplomatically embarrassed and with no strategic gain.

Despite Trump’s success in renegotiating NAFTA into the U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement, the economic impact fell short of expectations. Trade deficits persisted, and job reshoring was limited. Meanwhile, Canada responded to Trump’s steel and aluminum tariffs not with deference, but by accelerating trade diversification and joining Pacific and European trade blocs.

Trump’s second term is more disciplined in its approach but retains its core flaw: mistaking pressure for partnership. Migration crackdowns, fentanyl crackdowns, and punitive tariffs dominate the agenda. Yet, regional governments continue to maneuver around the pressure, turning to China, the EU, and Gulf states for balance in a globalized world.

Notably, Argentina’s right-wing president Javier Milei—ideologically aligned with Trump—has kept close ties with Beijing. Brazil’s Lula is actively expanding engagement with China. And even Canada, Washington’s closest partner, continues to hedge with strategic diversification and selective defiance following Trump’s hostile tone with them.

Trump’s Strategy Could Undermine Long-Term U.S. Influence

Trump’s heavy-handed tactics reflect a fundamental misunderstanding of today’s Western Hemisphere. The United States is still the most powerful actor in the region, but its monopoly on influence is gone. Economic pluralism has created a new Latin American calculus: countries want U.S. cooperation, not domination. They will work with Washington when it suits them—but will turn elsewhere when the cost of alignment is too high.

Trump’s leadership style—brash, populist, autocratic—also undercuts his regional credibility. Latin American leaders, seasoned in their own populist politics, are immune to the theatrics. To them, Trump doesn’t represent a new kind of American leadership; he mirrors the worst of their own domestic strongmen.

If the U.S. wants to rebuild its role in Latin America, it must evolve. Coercion, threats, and unilateralism cannot substitute for long-term influence built on mutual interests. The U.S. needs to offer real economic alternatives to Chinese investment, credible support for development and infrastructure, and sustained diplomatic engagement that respects regional agency.

Partnership Over Pressure

Reasserting U.S. leadership will require more than slogans. Washington must help Latin American governments recognize the risks of overreliance on China—not through ultimatums, but by offering intelligence sharing, investment screening tools, cybersecurity cooperation, and help in defending against disinformation and illegal activities like cyber-espionage or illegal fishing.

In certain sectors—like infrastructure or climate adaptation—the U.S. might even consider limited cooperation with China, reframing regional engagement from zero-sum rivalry to shared opportunity. This would signal a shift from reactive aggression to proactive leadership, appealing to Latin American nations tired of great-power bickering on their turf.

The Western Hemisphere is no longer Washington’s uncontested backyard. It is a diverse, strategic arena where nations have choices. China’s rise, Russia’s persistence, and the region’s own maturation mean that fear will no longer suffice as the glue of U.S. influence.

If Washington wants to remain relevant, it must adapt. Trump’s coercive model has earned short-term concessions. But a sustainable vision for U.S. primacy in the Americas will require what his strategy lacks: diplomacy, respect, mutual benefit, and strategic humility. In a new era where alliances must be earned—not assumed—America must once again learn the art of partnership.