1/30 – International Relations Analysis Piece

Iran has faced significant turmoil over the past year. The unexpected death of its president in a helicopter crash compounded its internal instability. Externally, its strategic position has weakened due to multiple Israeli attacks, including strikes that obliterated key air defense and missile facilities. Furthermore, all of their closest regional allies—Syria’s Bashar al-Assad, Hezbollah in Lebanon, and Hamas in Gaza—have suffered severe blows, further isolating Tehran and the efficiency of its influence.

Despite these challenges, Iran’s nuclear program remains a rare area where it maintains some leverage. By late 2023, the country was producing approximately 7kg of uranium enriched to 60% each month—dangerously close to weapons-grade material. If enriched further, this output would be sufficient to produce around two nuclear bombs per year. Moreover, Iran has begun installing advanced centrifuges and feeding them with already highly enriched uranium. The pace of expansion is alarming. “The capacity is increasing by a factor of seven,” Rafael Grossi, the head of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), told The Economist, emphasizing that there is no plausible civilian application for this level of enrichment.

While Iran formally halted its nuclear weapons program in 2003, it continued engaging in weapons-related research. The 2020 assassination of Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, a key nuclear physicist, likely orchestrated by Israel, created a leadership vacuum. However, according to an Israeli intelligence source, “there are now at least five or six Fakhrizadehs, and they’re much harder to get at.” This suggests that multiple figures have since assumed responsibility for Iran’s nuclear advancements.

Though Iran is not believed to have undisclosed enrichment sites beyond Natanz and Fordow, concerns persist about potential stockpiling of undeclared centrifuges for future use.

Within Israel, opinions are divided on whether a military strike could effectively derail Iran’s nuclear ambitions. Some high-ranking officials, emboldened by the success of last year’s strikes, argue that a well-coordinated attack—especially with U.S. support—could inflict significant damage. However, others remain skeptical. Ehud Barak, Israel’s former prime minister and once an advocate for military intervention, admitted in October that Iran’s program is now too advanced and deeply entrenched to be easily neutralized. “Practically speaking, you cannot easily delay them in any significant manner,” he conceded.

A successful attack would require advanced bunker-busting bombs and real-time intelligence—assets that only the U.S. could provide. However, Trump appears reluctant to authorize such an operation.

Although Trump has insisted, “They can’t have a nuclear weapon… they are religious zealots,” his initial policy decisions indicate a preference for economic pressure over military confrontation. Hours after assuming office, he dismissed Brian Hook, a key Iran hawk who had served as his first-term Iran envoy. He also revoked security protection for Hook and former Secretary of State Mike Pompeo—both of whom had been targeted by Iranian assassination threats following Trump’s 2020 decision to eliminate Qassem Suleimani, a high-ranking Iranian general.

Several of Trump’s newly appointed officials share a desire to minimize U.S. entanglement in the Middle East. Elbridge Colby, the Pentagon’s new policy chief, advocates shifting American focus toward Asia. Meanwhile, speculation that Trump might appoint real-estate investor Steve Witkoff as his envoy to Iran has further unsettled hawks in Washington.

For now, Trump appears committed to reimposing and intensifying economic sanctions under his “maximum pressure” campaign. However, the crucial question remains: what is the ultimate goal? While Trump must decide how aggressively to roll back Iran’s nuclear progress, he also faces the dilemma of whether to demand constraints beyond those outlined in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the 2015 nuclear deal that he withdrew from in 2018.

Grossi, the IAEA chief, has expressed confidence that his agency could implement a monitoring system to oversee Iran’s nuclear activities. However, he warned that the IAEA remains “pretty much in the dark” about Iran’s procurement of centrifuge components, highlighting the challenges of verifying compliance.

Iran’s leadership is caught in a difficult position. The destruction of its missile stockpiles, the degradation of its air defenses, and the weakening of its regional allies make the pursuit of nuclear weapons more attractive as a deterrent. Yet these same vulnerabilities also make Iran ill-equipped to withstand the consequences of getting caught in a nuclear breakout attempt.

Over the past year, Israeli intelligence operations have demonstrated an unprecedented ability to infiltrate Iran’s security apparatus. This raises the likelihood that any covert nuclear activity would be quickly exposed, triggering international backlash—or even military action.

Following a visit to Iran in November, Grossi noted that Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian exhibited “a desire to engage with us more constructively and comprehensively.” However, Pezeshkian wields little influence over nuclear policy. Still, even those with decision-making power in Tehran may find it pragmatic to pursue negotiations. Economic hardship continues to cripple the country, and Trump’s unpredictability—combined with the growing risks of Israeli intervention—provides strong incentives for diplomacy. “Iran is likely to choose negotiations for now,” assessed Raz Zimmt, an Iran expert at Tel Aviv University. However, he remains doubtful that Trump and Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, can find common ground. “They will try and string [Mr. Trump] along in negotiations,” an Israeli intelligence official predicted.

Time is running out for a diplomatic resolution. Grossi acknowledges that efforts to prevent Iran from achieving nuclear capability are constrained by a “very tight timeline.” Under the JCPOA framework, Britain, France, and Germany—the last three Western signatories—can vote to reinstate comprehensive pre-2015 sanctions on Iran. In December, they warned Tehran that they would exercise this option if no progress was made. However, if they fail to act by October, their ability to reimpose sanctions automatically expires.

Iran, in turn, has threatened to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in retaliation. European powers remain divided on how to proceed, with no clear consensus between London, Paris, and Berlin.

Adding further uncertainty, Israeli officials have signaled that they may take unilateral action if they detect signs of Iran making a clandestine push for nuclear weapons. With U.S. allies anxiously awaiting Trump’s next move, he remains steadfast in his nonchalant stance. “Iran will hopefully make a deal,” he reiterated on January 23rd. “And if they don’t make a deal, that’s okay too.”

As the situation unfolds, Iran’s nuclear ambitions, Israel’s strategic calculations, and Trump’s policy decisions continue to shape the region’s future. With diplomatic channels still open but military action looming as an ever-present possibility, the coming months will be critical in determining whether escalation can be averted—or if the Middle East is on the brink of yet another crisis.