IRinFive

Tag: syria

  • Syria One Year After Assad: A Fragile Transformation

    12/8 – International Relations & Geopolitical Analysis

    Damascus prepares for the first anniversary of the coup that ousted long-time dictator Bashar al Assad’s flight from the capital. Visitors from across the country are filling the streets, eager to celebrate what they call their liberation from decades of authoritarian rule. Yet the jubilation is tempered by uncertainty, competing political experiments, and a growing sense that the revolution’s unraveling new chapter is proving more complex than the first. 

    From the earliest days of Syria’s uprising in 2011, the Assad regime framed the conflict as a choice between authoritarian stability and violent anarchy. The dynasty insisted that only its iron-fisted control prevented Syria from descending into chaos. That narrative collapsed on December 8th 2024, when a fast moving rebel offensive forced the ruler to abandon Damascus and flee into exile in Russia. His departure closed a brutal period defined by mass torture, indiscriminate bombardment, and deep social fragmentation. It also revealed that the true driver of Syria’s chaos had not been the prospect of Assad’s removal, but his refusal to accept it.

    In the year that followed, Syria has demonstrated a surprising degree of resilience. The state did not disintegrate, sectarian militias did not overwhelm the major cities, and the much warned collapse of public order never truly materialized. Instead, an unlikely figure emerged to hold the country’s fragile political center: Ahmed al Sharaa, a former jihadist commander once vilified by the Assad regime and foreign governments alike.

    The Rise of Ahmed al Sharaa

    Sharaa assumed power as interim president with a reputation that alarmed Syrians and outsiders. Assad had long warned that his possible ouster would open the door for extremist rule, portraying figures like Sharaa as the very threat his dictatorship was meant to prevent. Yet the new president has so far defied many of those predictions. Rather than imposing religious law or reviving the coercive apparatus of the old state, he has presented himself as a pragmatist intent on stabilizing the country and reintegrating it into regional and global politics.

    Sharaa’s most visible successes have appeared on the international stage. He has rapidly repaired Syria’s diplomatic isolation. Western governments, once committed to squeezing Assad’s Syria through sanctions, have begun to rethink their approach. President Donald Trump welcomed Sharaa to the White House in November, an event that drew global attention and solidified a growing personal rapport between the two leaders. Washington has temporarily suspended several sanctions on Syria and is preparing a broader review. 

    Gulf states, historically wary of Syria’s alignment with Iran, have responded with enthusiasm. Investment delegations from the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia now travel regularly to Damascus. In December, executives from Chevron visited the capital to examine potential energy projects. DP World, a major Emirati firm, has secured a significant contract to operate the port of Tartus.

    All of this represents a profound geopolitical shift. A country once dependent on Tehran and Moscow now signals interest in joining the region’s pro Western economic and political axis. Instead of serving as a hub for illicit drug production, as it did in Assad’s final years, Syria is courting legitimate trade, infrastructure development, and foreign capital.  

    Rebranding the State

    At home, Sharaa has moved swiftly to erase symbols of the old order. The red Baathist flag was quickly replaced with the green revolutionary banner. Much of the intelligence network that terrorized the population for decades has been dissolved. Hundreds of prisons stand empty. Syrians now openly criticize their government in cafés and online platforms without fear of immediate reprisal. Women have even been recruited into the police, and life in Damascus’s old city continues with restaurants serving wine and bars operating late into the night. Contrary to the dire warnings once issued by Assad loyalists, the country has not transformed into an extremist sanctuary. 

    The new leadership has undone long standing structures of repression, but it has not yet been able to address the immense economic damage left by years of internal conflict and sanctions. The Syrian economy remains shattered. GDP has fallen more than 70 percent since 2011, public services are strained, and millions require housing and employment. Sanctions relief has not yet produced significant recovery. Hundreds of thousands of government workers have lost their jobs, fuel and food subsidies are being reduced, and reconstruction remains largely stalled.

    Emerging Problems

    While Sharaa has succeeded in preventing a return to civil war, serious governance issues are now jeopardizing Syria’s fragile revival. Instead of rebuilding state institutions, he has begun constructing parallel bodies that concentrate power among trusted loyalists. These entities operate outside constitutional frameworks and often supersede existing ministries.

    One of the most concerning examples is the recently created General Authority for Borders and Customs. Rather than restoring the finance ministry’s authority, the president handed control of customs revenue to a former jihadist associate and confidant. A sovereign wealth fund, similarly established by decree, functions with no public oversight. Lawyers in Damascus argue that such bodies possess no clear legal foundation.

    A new General Secretariat for Political Affairs has also emerged, headed by the foreign minister. Its influence is opaque yet far reaching. Civil society groups report cancelled events after venue owners received warnings from the secretariat. Others say it quietly screened candidates during the recent elections.

    For much of the year Syria has been governed through a confusing mixture of presidential directives and ministerial orders. Laws are announced, then revoked, or contradicted by competing authorities. A constitutional convention assembled in March granted Sharaa sweeping executive powers. In October, he implemented a highly restricted electoral process in which an approved electoral college selected two thirds of the new parliament from a prechosen roster. The president will appoint the remaining members. Whether the incoming legislature will serve as a meaningful check on executive authority remains uncertain.

    These developments have left many Syrians uneasy. The apparatus of Assad’s dictatorship has been dismantled, but the construction of a transparent, accountable state has yet to begin.

    A transitional justice body was established to address past crimes, but it remains unfunded and inactive. Many of Assad’s old officials continue to hold influence, and some have been absorbed into the new administration. Meanwhile, without a functioning judicial process, communities have resorted to revenge killings. These incidents occur frequently in mixed regions around Homs and the coastal areas, where memories of wartime atrocities still shape daily interactions.

    Syrians who fought for democratic values argue that the revolution was driven not only by economic hardship but by a desire for dignity, justice, and real citizenship. The persistence of extrajudicial violence and absence of accountability undermines those aspirations.

    The most serious challenge to Sharaa’s rule involves his fraught relationship with Syria’s minority groups. Although he speaks publicly about the importance of the country’s religious and ethnic diversity, his actions have not reassured those who fear domination by a Sunni majority under the leadership of a former jihadist.

    Twice in the past year security forces committed grave massacres while confronting local uprisings. In March they responded to an attempted insurrection by Alawite fighters loyal to the exiled Assad regime. In July they crushed a Druze uprising in Suwayda. Community leaders say trust has been shattered and that the wounds will last for generations. Alawite communities fear marginalization and express interest in renewed insurgency if exclusion continues.

    Sharaa has urged minority groups to disarm and integrate into the new state. Yet many argue that he has failed to understand why these communities feel vulnerable and distrustful. Concentrating authority among his relatives and loyalists only deepens their concerns.

    Despite these challenges, Sharaa has managed to keep Syria united during its most precarious transition since independence. He remains the only figure currently capable of balancing the competing factions that emerged during the war. His international diplomacy has revived Syria’s global relevance, and his initial social reforms have created space for personal freedoms that were previously absent for decades.

    However, the durability of Syria’s transformation will depend on whether he can evolve from a revolutionary leader into the head of a pluralistic state. The coming months will test whether he is willing to decentralize authority, empower ministries, engage civil society, and share governance with groups who historically feared Sunni Islamist rule.

    A newly seated parliament, expected in January, could either serve as a genuine legislative counterweight or revert to the symbolic function of Assad’s former rubber stamp assembly. The direction it takes will determine whether Syria moves toward institutional stability or renewed authoritarian improvisation.

    Analysis:

    One year after Assad’s departure, Syria presents a landscape of cautious optimism overshadowed by emerging authoritarian patterns. Sharaa has defied expectations by preventing state collapse, gaining Western support, and repositioning Syria within regional politics. His diplomacy has been surprisingly effective, and his dismantling of the old security state reflects a significant departure from decades of repression.

    Yet the concentration of power in new informal bodies, the lack of constitutional clarity, and the exclusion of minority communities reveal a governing approach still shaped by the habits of clandestine movements rather than statecraft. Sharaa appears more comfortable improvising through trusted networks than building transparent institutions capable of surviving beyond his tenure.

    The greatest risk ahead is not immediate conflict but a gradual slide into a new form of personalized rule that replaces the Baathist model without fundamentally transforming it. If Sharaa fails to understand the fears of minorities and continues to rely on loyalist structures outside the formal state, Syria may once again face internal fragmentation.

    For now, Syrians celebrate a future free of Assad’s brutal dynasty. Whether that future matures into a stable and inclusive state will depend on Sharaa’s willingness to transition from revolutionary commander to constitutional ruler. 

  • Germany Wants to Send Its Syrian Refugees Back Home

    11/11 – International News & Geopolitical Analysis

    Germany’s migration debate has taken a sharp turn. A decade after hundreds of thousands of Syrians found refuge in Germany during the worst years of the Syrian civil war, Chancellor Friedrich Merz has announced a new drive to encourage and in some cases enforce returns. The chancellor says the fighting that drove the original exodus has ended and that Germany should now work with Syria’s transitional authorities to facilitate reconstruction and repatriation. He has invited Syria’s interim president, Ahmed al-Sharaa, to Berlin to discuss practical steps, including the deportation of Syrians convicted of crimes.

    This policy shift is the product of converging political forces and changing geopolitics. It follows a dramatic reversal of fortunes in Syria, where the Al-Asad regime that dominated for years has been replaced by a transitional government headed by al-Sharaa and where international actors are reengaging with Damascus. It also reflects domestic pressure from the far-right Alternative für Deutschland, which has made mass returns and strict migration control its signature issue as it gains ground in polls and regional contests. Chancellor Merz frames his new stance as a correction of past open-door policies and as a response to voter concerns about migration and public safety.

    From 2011 to 2015, the Syrian conflict drove a sustained outflow of people. Germany became a major destination after the 2015 refugee wave, when Chancellor Angela Merkel’s government admitted large waves of asylum seekers. Over the following years Syrian nationals grew to become one of the largest foreign groups in Germany. Integration efforts and naturalisations proceeded unevenly but steadily.

    In 2024 and 2025, the military and political picture in Syria changed. Opposition forces and new transitional authorities overthrew the previous regime, and a transitional president was installed in early 2025. That new leadership immediately began courting foreign investment, aid and diplomatic recognition as it sought to rebuild. Western capitals started to reopen channels of engagement, and the White House planned meetings with Syria’s transitional president in November 2025. Those shifts opened the door in Berlin to new discussions about returns and reconstruction.

    Just recently Chancellor Merz made his most explicit public move by saying the civil war is over and that the grounds for asylum have therefore changed. He invited President al-Sharaa to Berlin to negotiate cooperation on repatriations and signalled that Germany will prioritize the deportation of Syrians with criminal convictions while pushing for broader voluntary return programs. Merz’s announcement followed visits by German officials to Syria and came as the migration issue climbed the domestic political agenda ahead of critical state elections.

    How realistic are mass returns?

    Germany hosts close to a million people of Syrian nationality and more than a million people of Syrian origin when second generation and naturalized citizens are counted. Hundreds of thousands arrived in 2015 and the subsequent years under Merkel’s asylum policy. Many have since entered the German labour market, taken up skilled and system-relevant jobs and in recent years large numbers have become naturalised citizens following changes to the nationality law. Official labor market data show several hundred thousand Syrians in employment and a rising employment rate among Syrians as integration progresses. In 2024 more than 80,000 Syrians were naturalized, and employment figures for Syrians approached three hundred thousand in official counts.

    Those figures explain why large scale forced returns would be difficult to carry out. A substantial share of Syrians in Germany are employed, pay into the social system and some are fully naturalized citizens. Many have built lives in German cities. With this in mind, legal barriers, human rights obligations, and logistical hurdles combine to limit how far Berlin can push blanket repatriation. In the short term the government appears to be focused on deporting people with criminal convictions and on creating incentives for voluntary return rather than immediate mass expulsions. Official returns so far remain a tiny fraction of the Syrian population in Germany.

    Berlin’s tougher posture clashes with repeated assessments about the conditions Syrians would face on return. German foreign ministry officials who visited devastated areas of Syria described widespread destruction and stressed that many parts of the country are not yet able to host returnees with dignity and security. The UN and humanitarian organizations caution that large parts of Syria remain aid dependent and unstable, and they warn against repatriation policies that do not meet international protection standards. Those assessments create both legal and moral constraints on any rapid program to repatriate refugees.

    Domestic political fissures. The Merz initiative has exposed divisions inside the government and within his own conservative ranks. Some ministers and lawmakers flagged the practical impossibility for many refugees to return quickly because of broken infrastructure and ongoing insecurity. Others argue that integration has limits and that Germany must rebalance its migration and citizenship policies after a decade of large inflows. Coalition politics also complicate matters. The chancellor governs in alliance with the center-left Social Democratic Party, which has urged caution and emphasized humanitarian obligations and integration gains.

    Electoral dynamics and the AfD effect

    Political incentives are central to understanding the current push for repatriation. The AfD’s surge in several state polls and its consistent focus on migration have put migration at the center of national debate. Merz’s shift is intended in part to reclaim votes on the right by adopting a tougher tone and concrete measures while avoiding the AfD’s most extreme rhetoric. The AfD, however, is demanding faster and more sweeping action and is prepared to promise forced mass deportations, a stance that continues to push the entire debate rightward. Analysts note that even a hardening of policy by the chancellor may not be sufficient to blunt the AfD’s momentum.

    The German government is emphasizing programs to encourage voluntary returns by linking reconstruction assistance to return, offering financial help and creating administrative pathways for people who choose to go home. That carrot approach mirrors earlier European experiences with returns, though the scale and political context make this episode unique.

    The government is also pursuing bilateral agreements to accept returns of people convicted of crimes. The invitation to President al-Sharaa is designed to secure practical cooperation from Syrian authorities for those targeted deportations. Human rights groups warn that such bilateral arrangements must ensure returnees will not face persecution, punishment or summary reprisals. Lessons from previous European repatriation initiatives show that returns without robust safeguards can have serious humanitarian and legal consequences.

    Analysis:

    For Syrian individuals and families the policy shift injects fresh uncertainty. Many have already integrated into the workforce, some have become citizens, and younger people born or raised in Germany have growing ties to German society. Efforts to encourage returns hit against those lived realities and risk social dislocation if not managed carefully. For Germany the debate poses a policy trade off between electoral politics and long term labour market and demographic needs. Syrians occupy roles in health care, transport and other sectors where labour shortages are acute. Large scale departures could exacerbate workforce gaps. At the same time, migration is now a core electoral issue and political leaders are using policy to signal responsiveness to voters.

    For now it seems Merz’s announcement is less a technical plan for immediate mass repatriations than a political gambit. It seeks to reframe conservative politics in Germany and to respond to a powerful challenger on the right. The chancellor is trying to walk a narrow line. He must appear decisive on migration to hold off the AfD while avoiding measures that would unravel coalition unity or contravene legal protections and humanitarian obligations.

    Three risks stand out. First, the humanitarian risk. A return program that is premature or poorly supervised risks sending people into shattered towns and insecure regions. That would produce human suffering and potential breaches of Germany’s international commitments. Second, the social risk. Pushing out people who are integrated into the economy and who have acquired rights through naturalization or long residence could damage local labour markets and public services that already rely on migrant labour. Third, the political risk. The policy could intensify polarization and give the AfD further leverage if voters see the measures as either too lax or too harsh.

    There are also pragmatic options the government has yet to exhaust. Investing in post-conflict reconstruction programs tied to voluntary return is a sensible long term strategy. Targeted cooperation with Syrian authorities on returns of convicted criminals is legally more defensible than mass expulsions. Strengthening integration programs at home and communicating realistic timelines for any repatriation program would reduce panic and should be part of the official narrative.

    Ultimately this episode reveals how migration policy is being reshaped by international events and domestic politics. The fall of the old Syrian regime and the emergence of a transitional authority changed the geopolitical calculus. At the same time the AfD’s electoral appeal is forcing mainstream parties to compete and finally speak up on migration. Germany now faces a test of governance to manage a politically fraught issue without abandoning international law, humanitarian standards and the social gains of integration.