IRinFive

Tag: international politics

  • Syria One Year After Assad: A Fragile Transformation

    12/8 – International Relations & Geopolitical Analysis

    Damascus prepares for the first anniversary of the coup that ousted long-time dictator Bashar al Assad’s flight from the capital. Visitors from across the country are filling the streets, eager to celebrate what they call their liberation from decades of authoritarian rule. Yet the jubilation is tempered by uncertainty, competing political experiments, and a growing sense that the revolution’s unraveling new chapter is proving more complex than the first. 

    From the earliest days of Syria’s uprising in 2011, the Assad regime framed the conflict as a choice between authoritarian stability and violent anarchy. The dynasty insisted that only its iron-fisted control prevented Syria from descending into chaos. That narrative collapsed on December 8th 2024, when a fast moving rebel offensive forced the ruler to abandon Damascus and flee into exile in Russia. His departure closed a brutal period defined by mass torture, indiscriminate bombardment, and deep social fragmentation. It also revealed that the true driver of Syria’s chaos had not been the prospect of Assad’s removal, but his refusal to accept it.

    In the year that followed, Syria has demonstrated a surprising degree of resilience. The state did not disintegrate, sectarian militias did not overwhelm the major cities, and the much warned collapse of public order never truly materialized. Instead, an unlikely figure emerged to hold the country’s fragile political center: Ahmed al Sharaa, a former jihadist commander once vilified by the Assad regime and foreign governments alike.

    The Rise of Ahmed al Sharaa

    Sharaa assumed power as interim president with a reputation that alarmed Syrians and outsiders. Assad had long warned that his possible ouster would open the door for extremist rule, portraying figures like Sharaa as the very threat his dictatorship was meant to prevent. Yet the new president has so far defied many of those predictions. Rather than imposing religious law or reviving the coercive apparatus of the old state, he has presented himself as a pragmatist intent on stabilizing the country and reintegrating it into regional and global politics.

    Sharaa’s most visible successes have appeared on the international stage. He has rapidly repaired Syria’s diplomatic isolation. Western governments, once committed to squeezing Assad’s Syria through sanctions, have begun to rethink their approach. President Donald Trump welcomed Sharaa to the White House in November, an event that drew global attention and solidified a growing personal rapport between the two leaders. Washington has temporarily suspended several sanctions on Syria and is preparing a broader review. 

    Gulf states, historically wary of Syria’s alignment with Iran, have responded with enthusiasm. Investment delegations from the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia now travel regularly to Damascus. In December, executives from Chevron visited the capital to examine potential energy projects. DP World, a major Emirati firm, has secured a significant contract to operate the port of Tartus.

    All of this represents a profound geopolitical shift. A country once dependent on Tehran and Moscow now signals interest in joining the region’s pro Western economic and political axis. Instead of serving as a hub for illicit drug production, as it did in Assad’s final years, Syria is courting legitimate trade, infrastructure development, and foreign capital.  

    Rebranding the State

    At home, Sharaa has moved swiftly to erase symbols of the old order. The red Baathist flag was quickly replaced with the green revolutionary banner. Much of the intelligence network that terrorized the population for decades has been dissolved. Hundreds of prisons stand empty. Syrians now openly criticize their government in cafés and online platforms without fear of immediate reprisal. Women have even been recruited into the police, and life in Damascus’s old city continues with restaurants serving wine and bars operating late into the night. Contrary to the dire warnings once issued by Assad loyalists, the country has not transformed into an extremist sanctuary. 

    The new leadership has undone long standing structures of repression, but it has not yet been able to address the immense economic damage left by years of internal conflict and sanctions. The Syrian economy remains shattered. GDP has fallen more than 70 percent since 2011, public services are strained, and millions require housing and employment. Sanctions relief has not yet produced significant recovery. Hundreds of thousands of government workers have lost their jobs, fuel and food subsidies are being reduced, and reconstruction remains largely stalled.

    Emerging Problems

    While Sharaa has succeeded in preventing a return to civil war, serious governance issues are now jeopardizing Syria’s fragile revival. Instead of rebuilding state institutions, he has begun constructing parallel bodies that concentrate power among trusted loyalists. These entities operate outside constitutional frameworks and often supersede existing ministries.

    One of the most concerning examples is the recently created General Authority for Borders and Customs. Rather than restoring the finance ministry’s authority, the president handed control of customs revenue to a former jihadist associate and confidant. A sovereign wealth fund, similarly established by decree, functions with no public oversight. Lawyers in Damascus argue that such bodies possess no clear legal foundation.

    A new General Secretariat for Political Affairs has also emerged, headed by the foreign minister. Its influence is opaque yet far reaching. Civil society groups report cancelled events after venue owners received warnings from the secretariat. Others say it quietly screened candidates during the recent elections.

    For much of the year Syria has been governed through a confusing mixture of presidential directives and ministerial orders. Laws are announced, then revoked, or contradicted by competing authorities. A constitutional convention assembled in March granted Sharaa sweeping executive powers. In October, he implemented a highly restricted electoral process in which an approved electoral college selected two thirds of the new parliament from a prechosen roster. The president will appoint the remaining members. Whether the incoming legislature will serve as a meaningful check on executive authority remains uncertain.

    These developments have left many Syrians uneasy. The apparatus of Assad’s dictatorship has been dismantled, but the construction of a transparent, accountable state has yet to begin.

    A transitional justice body was established to address past crimes, but it remains unfunded and inactive. Many of Assad’s old officials continue to hold influence, and some have been absorbed into the new administration. Meanwhile, without a functioning judicial process, communities have resorted to revenge killings. These incidents occur frequently in mixed regions around Homs and the coastal areas, where memories of wartime atrocities still shape daily interactions.

    Syrians who fought for democratic values argue that the revolution was driven not only by economic hardship but by a desire for dignity, justice, and real citizenship. The persistence of extrajudicial violence and absence of accountability undermines those aspirations.

    The most serious challenge to Sharaa’s rule involves his fraught relationship with Syria’s minority groups. Although he speaks publicly about the importance of the country’s religious and ethnic diversity, his actions have not reassured those who fear domination by a Sunni majority under the leadership of a former jihadist.

    Twice in the past year security forces committed grave massacres while confronting local uprisings. In March they responded to an attempted insurrection by Alawite fighters loyal to the exiled Assad regime. In July they crushed a Druze uprising in Suwayda. Community leaders say trust has been shattered and that the wounds will last for generations. Alawite communities fear marginalization and express interest in renewed insurgency if exclusion continues.

    Sharaa has urged minority groups to disarm and integrate into the new state. Yet many argue that he has failed to understand why these communities feel vulnerable and distrustful. Concentrating authority among his relatives and loyalists only deepens their concerns.

    Despite these challenges, Sharaa has managed to keep Syria united during its most precarious transition since independence. He remains the only figure currently capable of balancing the competing factions that emerged during the war. His international diplomacy has revived Syria’s global relevance, and his initial social reforms have created space for personal freedoms that were previously absent for decades.

    However, the durability of Syria’s transformation will depend on whether he can evolve from a revolutionary leader into the head of a pluralistic state. The coming months will test whether he is willing to decentralize authority, empower ministries, engage civil society, and share governance with groups who historically feared Sunni Islamist rule.

    A newly seated parliament, expected in January, could either serve as a genuine legislative counterweight or revert to the symbolic function of Assad’s former rubber stamp assembly. The direction it takes will determine whether Syria moves toward institutional stability or renewed authoritarian improvisation.

    Analysis:

    One year after Assad’s departure, Syria presents a landscape of cautious optimism overshadowed by emerging authoritarian patterns. Sharaa has defied expectations by preventing state collapse, gaining Western support, and repositioning Syria within regional politics. His diplomacy has been surprisingly effective, and his dismantling of the old security state reflects a significant departure from decades of repression.

    Yet the concentration of power in new informal bodies, the lack of constitutional clarity, and the exclusion of minority communities reveal a governing approach still shaped by the habits of clandestine movements rather than statecraft. Sharaa appears more comfortable improvising through trusted networks than building transparent institutions capable of surviving beyond his tenure.

    The greatest risk ahead is not immediate conflict but a gradual slide into a new form of personalized rule that replaces the Baathist model without fundamentally transforming it. If Sharaa fails to understand the fears of minorities and continues to rely on loyalist structures outside the formal state, Syria may once again face internal fragmentation.

    For now, Syrians celebrate a future free of Assad’s brutal dynasty. Whether that future matures into a stable and inclusive state will depend on Sharaa’s willingness to transition from revolutionary commander to constitutional ruler. 

  • France in Turmoil as Yet Another Government Resigns

    10/8 – International News & Political Analysis

    France is confronted with yet another government resignation amid renewed political crisis after Prime Minister Sébastien Lecornu stepped down on October 6, less than a day after revealing his new cabinet. The move abruptly ended what was already a short tenure for Lecornu, who took office only 27 days ago, and left France without a functioning government at a moment of fragile finances and mounting social and electoral pressures. Financial markets reacted immediately and sharply, underscoring how domestic political failure is now spilling over into Europe’s wider economic landscape.

    Lecornu’s resignation arrived on Monday morning after he formally handed in the government’s resignation to President Emmanuel Macron. The cabinet had been announced on Sunday, following weeks of consultations between the president’s circle and other political forces. 

    Opponents and some would-be partners reacted with anger to the ministerial line-up. Some critics said it was too conservative. Others criticized it for being insufficiently different from previous administrations. The row exposed the underlying fragility of an already fractured parliament in which no party or coalition commands a majority. In public and in the corridors of power, deputies and party leaders warned that the arrangement could not win the support needed to pass critical legislation, especially the 2026 budget that Macron’s government must deliver to reassure debt markets.

    By midmorning, the resignation was official. Macron accepted it and charged Lecornu with a last-ditch mission to hold talks with political groups in a bid to find a path out of the impasse. The president has not resigned and has so far resisted dissolving the National Assembly, but the options available to him are narrowing fast.

    Political Fallout and Calls for New Elections

    The resignation amplified calls for decisive action from opposition forces. The far-right National Rally urged Macron to call immediate parliamentary elections. The hard left urged the president to step down. Many of Macron’s own allies privately expressed dismay, arguing that the new cabinet did not signal the fresh start required to stabilize governance.

    Lecornu framed his resignation as the result of an inability to find compromise across the political spectrum. He blamed partisan posturing and the appetite among some parties to behave as if they already controlled a majority. That dynamic, he suggested, made it impossible for him to remain in office. The resignation marks Lecornu as the fifth prime minister to serve under Macron since the president’s re-election and the shortest serving prime minister in modern French history by a wide margin.

    The opposition is not unified about what should happen next. Some actors prefer snap elections as the only route to restore legitimacy. Others, notably the Socialist Party and parts of the centre left, are open to negotiating a left-leaning executive rather than risk an immediate election that could hand power to the far right. 

    Markets reacted instantly. The Paris stock index plunged in early trading on Monday, banking shares were hit particularly hard and bond yields rose as investors recalibrated the risk of a political stalemate that could derail deficit reduction plans. The euro also fell against the dollar as confidence in France’s fiscal management weakened.

    The broader worry among investors is not solely the chaos of ministers coming and going. It is the prospect that Paris will be unable to pass and implement the spending cuts and reforms needed to get public finances under control. France’s deficit has been running at a high level, and shortfalls in achieving savings this year already weigh on market confidence. If the government cannot secure parliamentary support for a credible consolidation plan, borrowing costs could rise further in ways that would stress public finances and feed a feedback loop of political turmoil.

    Crisis Running Deep

    The current crisis did not emerge overnight. Its roots lie in a dramatic shift in French politics that began with Macron’s risky call for snap parliamentary elections in 2024. The polls he sought in order to broaden his mandate instead produced a hung parliament. Since then, party fragmentation has sharpened. The far right and the hard left now occupy much larger positions in the legislature and on the national political stage than they did just a few years ago. Macron’s centrist movement is squeezed between these two forces and now struggles to command a reliable governing majority.

    Parliamentary numbers matter because France’s Fifth Republic was created with the explicit aim of providing strong, stable governance under a president and a coherent parliamentary majority. That system assumes coalitions or majorities that can deliver swift legislative outcomes. The current reality of minority government means that France is operating without the steady center that once underpinned its political system.

    Timing here matters as France faces urgent fiscal choices. The government must propose a budget that credibly reduces the deficit and reassures both domestic and international investors. Lawmakers know that the next budget will be politically painful. That reality has heightened partisan demands and made compromise harder to achieve.

    Beyond immediate fiscal matters, the crisis has wide political stakes. Opinion polls show the traditional center has lost ground. The National Rally’s share of first-round support in parliamentary voting intentions has grown dramatically over recent years. The hard left has also expanded its base. If elections were held now, polls suggest the center would struggle to regain the initiative. For Macron, whose presidency was intended to lock the extremes out of power by reshaping the center ground, this is an existential test.

    Some within the centrist camp still argue that pragmatic deals are possible on fiscal policy and that a narrow path to compromise remains open. But France lacks a deep culture of coalition making. Centrist and moderate parties have been weakened and face internal divisions over how to respond to migration, public spending, pensions and taxation. Those divisions make a durable agreement much harder to forge.

    What’s Next for France?

    President Macron faces a constrained range of choices. He can ask another figure to try to form a government. He can reappoint Lecornu with a new mandate and some political concessions. He can dissolve the National Assembly and call new elections, a hazardous option that could hand momentum to parties on the extremes. Or he can resign. So far Macron has rejected resignation. Behind the scenes there is urgent activity to explore cross-party agreements that could stabilize the budget process without elections.

    The immediate period ahead looks likely to be one of muddling through. Short term stopgaps will remain the likely pattern unless one of the main parties shifts strategy to back a compromise cabinet. The bond market and public patience will be closely watching whether France can move beyond episodic collapses and deliver a credible plan to reduce the deficit.

    Analysis:

    France’s crisis is a symptom of deeper realignments in Western politics. The traditional bucket of centrist technocracy is under assault from movements that capitalize in clarity of grievance and identity. Macron’s entire project relied on creating a new center that could marshal technocratic competence to fend off populist extremes. Yet, his centrist project has run into brutal limits and seems to have rendered France ungovernable.

    The Fifth Republic presumes a majority dynamic that allows a president to govern decisively. Once that majority evaporated, the institutional design that served France well in earlier eras has become brittle. Political communications and the media environment amplify the appeal of simple certainties. Populists trade in unapologetic priorities: control borders, promise security, offer immediate relief. Centrist technocrats sell competence and long term strategy. When the electorate is anxious and budgets are tight, the former political pitch resonates more easily than the latter.

    What France needs if it is to escape the spiral is not merely another reshuffle. It needs a renewed commitment to cross-party bargaining and a credible fiscal plan that can be explained simply and fairly. That will require concessions from multiple sides, including some painful compromises from Macron’s center. It will also require an investment in messaging that links necessary fiscal prudence to concrete protections for citizens and growth strategies that feel inclusive.

    If that cannot be achieved, France risks a prolonged period of unstable governments. That would not only erode domestic policy capacity, it would weaken France’s influence in Europe at a time when the continent faces many strategic challenges. The coming weeks will determine whether Paris can convert this crisis into a negotiated adjustment or whether the political center will continue to fragment, yielding ground to more extreme forces both on the Left and the Right.