12/8 – International Relations & Geopolitical Analysis

Damascus prepares for the first anniversary of the coup that ousted long-time dictator Bashar al Assad’s flight from the capital. Visitors from across the country are filling the streets, eager to celebrate what they call their liberation from decades of authoritarian rule. Yet the jubilation is tempered by uncertainty, competing political experiments, and a growing sense that the revolution’s unraveling new chapter is proving more complex than the first. 

From the earliest days of Syria’s uprising in 2011, the Assad regime framed the conflict as a choice between authoritarian stability and violent anarchy. The dynasty insisted that only its iron-fisted control prevented Syria from descending into chaos. That narrative collapsed on December 8th 2024, when a fast moving rebel offensive forced the ruler to abandon Damascus and flee into exile in Russia. His departure closed a brutal period defined by mass torture, indiscriminate bombardment, and deep social fragmentation. It also revealed that the true driver of Syria’s chaos had not been the prospect of Assad’s removal, but his refusal to accept it.

In the year that followed, Syria has demonstrated a surprising degree of resilience. The state did not disintegrate, sectarian militias did not overwhelm the major cities, and the much warned collapse of public order never truly materialized. Instead, an unlikely figure emerged to hold the country’s fragile political center: Ahmed al Sharaa, a former jihadist commander once vilified by the Assad regime and foreign governments alike.

The Rise of Ahmed al Sharaa

Sharaa assumed power as interim president with a reputation that alarmed Syrians and outsiders. Assad had long warned that his possible ouster would open the door for extremist rule, portraying figures like Sharaa as the very threat his dictatorship was meant to prevent. Yet the new president has so far defied many of those predictions. Rather than imposing religious law or reviving the coercive apparatus of the old state, he has presented himself as a pragmatist intent on stabilizing the country and reintegrating it into regional and global politics.

Sharaa’s most visible successes have appeared on the international stage. He has rapidly repaired Syria’s diplomatic isolation. Western governments, once committed to squeezing Assad’s Syria through sanctions, have begun to rethink their approach. President Donald Trump welcomed Sharaa to the White House in November, an event that drew global attention and solidified a growing personal rapport between the two leaders. Washington has temporarily suspended several sanctions on Syria and is preparing a broader review. 

Gulf states, historically wary of Syria’s alignment with Iran, have responded with enthusiasm. Investment delegations from the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia now travel regularly to Damascus. In December, executives from Chevron visited the capital to examine potential energy projects. DP World, a major Emirati firm, has secured a significant contract to operate the port of Tartus.

All of this represents a profound geopolitical shift. A country once dependent on Tehran and Moscow now signals interest in joining the region’s pro Western economic and political axis. Instead of serving as a hub for illicit drug production, as it did in Assad’s final years, Syria is courting legitimate trade, infrastructure development, and foreign capital.  

Rebranding the State

At home, Sharaa has moved swiftly to erase symbols of the old order. The red Baathist flag was quickly replaced with the green revolutionary banner. Much of the intelligence network that terrorized the population for decades has been dissolved. Hundreds of prisons stand empty. Syrians now openly criticize their government in cafés and online platforms without fear of immediate reprisal. Women have even been recruited into the police, and life in Damascus’s old city continues with restaurants serving wine and bars operating late into the night. Contrary to the dire warnings once issued by Assad loyalists, the country has not transformed into an extremist sanctuary. 

The new leadership has undone long standing structures of repression, but it has not yet been able to address the immense economic damage left by years of internal conflict and sanctions. The Syrian economy remains shattered. GDP has fallen more than 70 percent since 2011, public services are strained, and millions require housing and employment. Sanctions relief has not yet produced significant recovery. Hundreds of thousands of government workers have lost their jobs, fuel and food subsidies are being reduced, and reconstruction remains largely stalled.

Emerging Problems

While Sharaa has succeeded in preventing a return to civil war, serious governance issues are now jeopardizing Syria’s fragile revival. Instead of rebuilding state institutions, he has begun constructing parallel bodies that concentrate power among trusted loyalists. These entities operate outside constitutional frameworks and often supersede existing ministries.

One of the most concerning examples is the recently created General Authority for Borders and Customs. Rather than restoring the finance ministry’s authority, the president handed control of customs revenue to a former jihadist associate and confidant. A sovereign wealth fund, similarly established by decree, functions with no public oversight. Lawyers in Damascus argue that such bodies possess no clear legal foundation.

A new General Secretariat for Political Affairs has also emerged, headed by the foreign minister. Its influence is opaque yet far reaching. Civil society groups report cancelled events after venue owners received warnings from the secretariat. Others say it quietly screened candidates during the recent elections.

For much of the year Syria has been governed through a confusing mixture of presidential directives and ministerial orders. Laws are announced, then revoked, or contradicted by competing authorities. A constitutional convention assembled in March granted Sharaa sweeping executive powers. In October, he implemented a highly restricted electoral process in which an approved electoral college selected two thirds of the new parliament from a prechosen roster. The president will appoint the remaining members. Whether the incoming legislature will serve as a meaningful check on executive authority remains uncertain.

These developments have left many Syrians uneasy. The apparatus of Assad’s dictatorship has been dismantled, but the construction of a transparent, accountable state has yet to begin.

A transitional justice body was established to address past crimes, but it remains unfunded and inactive. Many of Assad’s old officials continue to hold influence, and some have been absorbed into the new administration. Meanwhile, without a functioning judicial process, communities have resorted to revenge killings. These incidents occur frequently in mixed regions around Homs and the coastal areas, where memories of wartime atrocities still shape daily interactions.

Syrians who fought for democratic values argue that the revolution was driven not only by economic hardship but by a desire for dignity, justice, and real citizenship. The persistence of extrajudicial violence and absence of accountability undermines those aspirations.

The most serious challenge to Sharaa’s rule involves his fraught relationship with Syria’s minority groups. Although he speaks publicly about the importance of the country’s religious and ethnic diversity, his actions have not reassured those who fear domination by a Sunni majority under the leadership of a former jihadist.

Twice in the past year security forces committed grave massacres while confronting local uprisings. In March they responded to an attempted insurrection by Alawite fighters loyal to the exiled Assad regime. In July they crushed a Druze uprising in Suwayda. Community leaders say trust has been shattered and that the wounds will last for generations. Alawite communities fear marginalization and express interest in renewed insurgency if exclusion continues.

Sharaa has urged minority groups to disarm and integrate into the new state. Yet many argue that he has failed to understand why these communities feel vulnerable and distrustful. Concentrating authority among his relatives and loyalists only deepens their concerns.

Despite these challenges, Sharaa has managed to keep Syria united during its most precarious transition since independence. He remains the only figure currently capable of balancing the competing factions that emerged during the war. His international diplomacy has revived Syria’s global relevance, and his initial social reforms have created space for personal freedoms that were previously absent for decades.

However, the durability of Syria’s transformation will depend on whether he can evolve from a revolutionary leader into the head of a pluralistic state. The coming months will test whether he is willing to decentralize authority, empower ministries, engage civil society, and share governance with groups who historically feared Sunni Islamist rule.

A newly seated parliament, expected in January, could either serve as a genuine legislative counterweight or revert to the symbolic function of Assad’s former rubber stamp assembly. The direction it takes will determine whether Syria moves toward institutional stability or renewed authoritarian improvisation.

Analysis:

One year after Assad’s departure, Syria presents a landscape of cautious optimism overshadowed by emerging authoritarian patterns. Sharaa has defied expectations by preventing state collapse, gaining Western support, and repositioning Syria within regional politics. His diplomacy has been surprisingly effective, and his dismantling of the old security state reflects a significant departure from decades of repression.

Yet the concentration of power in new informal bodies, the lack of constitutional clarity, and the exclusion of minority communities reveal a governing approach still shaped by the habits of clandestine movements rather than statecraft. Sharaa appears more comfortable improvising through trusted networks than building transparent institutions capable of surviving beyond his tenure.

The greatest risk ahead is not immediate conflict but a gradual slide into a new form of personalized rule that replaces the Baathist model without fundamentally transforming it. If Sharaa fails to understand the fears of minorities and continues to rely on loyalist structures outside the formal state, Syria may once again face internal fragmentation.

For now, Syrians celebrate a future free of Assad’s brutal dynasty. Whether that future matures into a stable and inclusive state will depend on Sharaa’s willingness to transition from revolutionary commander to constitutional ruler.